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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses leadership and charisma within the framework of social choice. In 
societies that lack formal institutional authorities, the power of leaders to coerce is 
limited. Under such conditions, we find that social outcomes will depend not only on 
policy preferences but also on how a leader's ability to transform voluntary efforts 
into some public good are conceived by other society members. The paper has three 
main results: (1) institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies that have identical 
characteristics might have different political equilibria (namely, they might choose 
different leaders and different policies); (2) under imperfect information regarding 
individuals' abilities, social choice may be biased toward less competent but more 
charismatic leaders; and (3) in uninstitutionalized societies, less competent, more 
charismatic leaders can achieve more in terms of social goals and welfare than can 
more competent and less charismatic ones.  
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1. Introduction 
Political economists have often adopted the view that after a candidate is elected for 
office he is authorized, as an office holder, to implement his chosen policy. This view 
is applicable to a variety of situations in which societies are equipped with sufficiently 
advanced administrative institutions that provide their leaders with coercive power.  
However, while this view on leaders' authority seems reasonable enough for 
sufficiently institutionalized societies, one must question what kind of leadership can 
be formed in societies where institutions are insufficiently advanced or are even 
totally missing. We refer to such societies that do not provide their leaders with a 
formal coercive authority as uninstitutionalized societies.  
Some examples of uninstitutionalized societies would be communities of settlers 
or of ethnic minorities, national movements, newborn trade unions, paramilitary 
organizations as well as many other emerged groupings that are still developing their 
institutions. Another would be a community created for a limited time and a specified 
purpose, such as a protest organization, a revolutionary movement, or any 
spontaneously organized political group formed on the basis of its members' mutual 
interests.2  
In uninstitutionalized societies, leaders cannot gain access to two kinds of 
authoritative apparatus that are generally available to office holders in 
institutionalized ones: (1) a monitoring system that enables office holders to detect 
whether citizens are obeying their instructions (paying taxes or doing various work 
tasks), and (2) a punitive system (such as law enforcement and legal systems) through 
                                                 
2
 Nonetheless, such uninstitutionalized societies have had a tremendous impact on political and 
historical processes. For instance, the communities of European settlers in South and North America 
established colonies that eventually became the foundation of the great nations of these continents. 
Another instance is when the Russian Czar's regime was overthrown in October 1917 by a small group 
of young intellectual revolutionaries who immediately established a communist regime in its place. 
 
 
which office holders can penalize citizens who were detected as disobedient. The 
absence of these types of apparatus can lead to two fundamental problems. The first is 
an agency problem that stems from the imperfect ability of leaders to observe citizens' 
actions, and the second is the inability of leaders to create incentives to followers 
through punishments. If, in addition, social outputs cannot be transferred (such as 
public goods) then leaders are also unable to create incentives to followers by issuing 
contracts.  
The fundamental feature of uninstitutionalized societies whereby leaders cannot 
detect nor penalize disobedient members has an important implication on 
uninstitutionalized societies. Leaders in such societies are unable to obligate followers 
to provide the resources essential for achieving societal goals and therefore must 
compel them to provide such resources voluntarily.3 However, since followers are 
likely to decide on how many resources to provide on the basis of the leader's 
attributes (such as the leader's policy choice and his ability to transform inputs into 
social outputs), these attributes may play a significant role not only in leadership 
formation processes (such as elections) but also – and equally important – in input 
supply. These conditions open up possibilities for interesting tradeoffs between 
leaders' abilities, leaders' policy choice, and followers' inputs provision, the result of 
which can significantly affect political outcomes. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a formal analysis of uninstitutionalized 
societies and to examine what kind of leadership might arise in such societies. The 
specific scenario on which we focus is where, on the one hand, leaders cannot enforce 
                                                 
3
 The proposition that leaders in uninstitutionalized societies cannot obligate members to provide 
essential resources gains support from recent evidence that links low quality institutions to high 
informal and underground economic activities such as tax evasion (see Friedman et al., 2000; Chong 
and Gradstein (2007); and Dabla-Norris et al. (2008)). In our model however, the main focus is not on 
fiscal resources but rather on resources that might be recruited in the form of effort, compliance and 
dedication. 
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collection of resources from society members due to a deficiency in authoritative 
institutions but, on the other, they need to recruit these resources in order to produce a 
policy. Our analytic vehicle is a citizen-candidate model (borrowed from Osborne and 
Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)) in which we add the assumption that 
after a leader has been chosen to lead, society members decide on how many inputs 
(efforts) to provide him with to manage their society. 
The paper has two central results.  
(1) Institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies that have identical 
characteristics might have different political equilibria (namely, they might 
choose different leaders and different policies). In the main text we analyze this 
result in a model of leadership with perfect information. 
(2) In the face of informational asymmetries regarding individuals' abilities, society 
members may be biased toward less competent but more charismatic leaders. 
We call this phenomenon the charisma bias.4 Surprisingly, in uninstitutionalized 
societies, these less competent but more charismatic leaders may achieve higher 
social welfare than more competent but less charismatic ones. This phenomenon 
is later analyzed in a model of leadership with imperfect information.  
The first result that institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies can differ in 
political equilibria is quite intuitive in light of the tradeoffs between policy choice and 
resource supply that emerge in uninstitutionalized societies. Due to these tradeoffs, 
leaders in uninstitutionalized societies might have an incentive to compromise 
policies they favor in order to elicit higher levels of effort, and society members might 
have an incentive to compromise policies they favor in order to obtain better leaders. 
Such incentives can significantly affect political outcomes. The second result whereby 
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Situations in which less competent leaders are overvalued (and therefore chosen to lead) might occur 
not only in uninstitutionalized societies. However, only in uninstitutionalized societies does this lead to 
higher provision of voluntary resources. 
 
informational asymmetries might lead to the charisma bias phenomenon, has a 
counterintuitive implication which needs further clarification. When society members 
have imperfect information about candidates' abilities, they must use candidates' 
attributes (such as self-confidence, power, poise, rhetorical abilities, etc.) as external 
signals of the desired leadership abilities. Yet, these external signals may very well 
lead society members to overvalue charismatic but incompetent candidates, and 
undervalue non-charismatic but more competent candidates. Under such conditions, 
members might choose less competent leaders while providing them with extra 
resources (charisma bias).  
The charisma bias phenomenon, however, does have an unexpected welfare 
implication. Whereas in institutionalized societies the rise of less competent but more 
charismatic leaders leads to misallocation of resources and welfare reduction, it might 
very well improve the allocation of resources and increase welfare in 
uninstitutionalized ones. The explanation to this counterintuitive result is that in 
uninstitutionalized societies, in which resources are voluntarily supplied for the 
production of public goods, the allocation of resources is normally suboptimal. 
Paradoxically, however, informational asymmetries may under certain conditions 
Pareto improve welfare by creating situations whereby leaders mislead society 
members into overvaluing them and consequently to exert levels of effort higher than 
they would in situations of perfect information. In section 5, which discusses the 
charisma bias phenomenon, we set the conditions under which this situation might 
occur.5 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
related literature; section 3 sets up the basic model and analyzes the leadership 
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 Specifically, we show in section 5 that the allocation of resources under incompetent but charismatic 
leaders can sometimes Pareto dominate the allocation of resources under more competent but not 
charismatic leaders. 
 
equilibrium in a perfect information setting; section 4 provides an example with a 
comparative analysis of political equilibria to demonstrate how institutionalized and 
uninstitutionalized societies differ; section 5 presents a model of leadership with 
imperfect information to demonstrate the charisma bias phenomenon and its welfare 
implication. Section 6 concludes the paper. The mathematical proofs appear in the 
appendix.  
 
2. Related Literature  
This research is to a large extent related to Max Weber's monumental work The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947).6 In that work, Weber classifies 
three types of authority: at one extreme are legal and traditional authorities based on 
rules and tradition (respectively), and at the other extreme is charismatic authority, 
based on devotion to the character of an individual person.7 In his definitions, Weber 
identifies the principal logical elements of the charisma bias phenomenon:  
The term "Charisma" will be applied to a certain quality of an individual 
personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, 
but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them 
the individual concerned is treated as a leader. [….] How the quality in question 
would be ultimately judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other such point of 
view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone 
important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to 
charismatic authority, by his "followers" or "disciples" [emphasis added]. 
(See Weber (1947), pp. 358-359.)  
    
                                                 
6
"The Theory of Social and Economic Organization" (1947) is a translation of Part I of Max Weber's 
(1921) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
7
Following Weber, a large body of literature in sociology and social psychology has emerged that 
studies the phenomenon of leadership. This literature can be classified according to the presumed 
factors that generate leadership (such as traits, behavior, power, influence or situational factors). For 
surveys see Yukl and Van Fleet (1991), Northouse (1997) and Yukl (1998). 
 	
Elsewhere, Weber writes: 
…the term 'charisma' shall be understood to refer to an extraordinarily quality 
of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or 
presumed.  'Charismatic authority,' hence, shall refer to a rule over men, 
whether predominantly external or predominantly internal, to which the 
governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the 
specific person  [emphasis added]. (See Weber (1946), pp. 295.) 
 
The distinction between institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies that is made 
in this paper fairly well parallels Weber's distinction between societies run by legal 
and those by charismatic authorities, and likewise, it corresponds to Weber's view that 
leaders' personality may itself create the foundation for authority. However, the paper 
also makes two further contributions. First, it shows how political equilibria might 
differ under these two different types of authorities, and second, it explores the 
welfare implications of the charisma bias phenomenon. 
The paper also relates to two different lines of research in the economic 
literature: the first maps different situations concerning voters and elections into 
plausible policy choice and is rooted in traditional electoral competition theory. The 
second examines leadership within the framework of incentive theory.  
The first line of research is largely based on Downs's (1957) political 
competition model and its numerous extensions (see Wittman (1977, 1983); Calvert 
(1985); Alesina (1988) and Alesina and Spear (1988)).8 Recently, newer studies in 
this area of research have emerged that analyze political equilibria in situations where 
every citizen can endogenously offer to run as a candidate (see Osborne and Slivinski 
(1996); Besley and Coate (1997)). These studies were implemented in other important 
                                                 
8Downs viewed policy as a means for winning elections, whereas Wittman (1977, 1983), Calvert 
(1985), Alesina and Spear (1988) and Alesina (1988) analyzed political equilibria with a fixed number 
of candidates who have distinct policy preferences. 
 

works, such as those dealing with lobbying (see Besley and Coate (2001)) and 
politicians' quality (see Caselli and Morelli (2004)). This literature, although 
providing considerable insights into a variety of situations of public choice with 
differing assumptions concerning voters and elections, generally ignores situations 
whereby leaders cannot coerce due to lack of formal institutions. Our theory makes an 
attempt to fill this gap by analyzing leadership formation under such conditions. 
The second line of research, pioneered by Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) and 
Hermalin (1998), views leadership as a device to create incentives in organizations 
under conditions of asymmetric information and incomplete contracting.9,10 This 
approach provides new insights into leader-organization interactions but generally 
ignores questions of how leadership is formed and why some rather than other 
individuals become leaders. Our paper addresses these questions by combining 
elements from both electoral competition theory and incentive theory. Specifically, 
we analyze the social processes leading to leadership formation in conjunction with 
those capacities enabling leaders to create incentives for resource contributions among 
society members.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) show that leaders who empathize with their employees adopt a 
participatory leadership style that can improve profitability if the firm can potentially exploit relatively 
many innovative ideas. Their model is based on the assumption that leaders' empathy with employees is 
common knowledge among an organization's members and therefore can serve as a commitment 
device.  
10
 Hermalin (1998) emphasizes the idea that leaders can convince followers that the information 
provided is indeed true by setting an example (followers become convinced that the leader considers 
the respective activity to be truly worthwhile, because he himself exerting high level of efforts). 
 
3.  The Basic Model of Leadership with Perfect Information. 
Consider a society inhabited by a finite number of individuals of different types, 
labeled },...,1{ nNi =∈ . Each member Ni∈  is endowed by a power index θi that 
represents his relative power among the other members of society.11 There are two 
interrelated types of goods: a menu of policies Q and a quantity measure g. A policy 
q∈Q represents a direction (or an ideological orientation) while the quantity measure 
g represents magnitude, that is, to what extent policy q is implemented.12 We assume 
that in a certain society, only one policy q∈Q can be implemented at a time and that 
society members have different policy preferences. For the sake of simplicity, we also 
assume that Q is an open interval in ℜ  (alternatively, ℜ=Q ). Society thus faces a 
decision problem when choosing policy q out of menu Q types of policies. 
Since both q and g are non-excludable and non-rival goods (once chosen and 
implemented, q and g are consumed by all society members whether willingly or upon 
constraint), we term the quantity measure g hereafter as a "directed" public good (or 
for short - a public good). 
 
3.1 Preferences  
Each individual gains utility (or disutility) from the policy q chosen by the 
leader, as well as from the quantity measure (the public good) g that his society 
provides. Individuals may also bear some non-monetary costs c(e) if they decide to 
                                                 
11In the usual context of electoral competition, all individuals have identical index power. However, as 
this paper explores leadership in a broader context where societies do not necessarily have formal 
institutions, the index power θi may represent different categories of power in different societies. These 
categories can include: relative physical strength, relative wealth and, in tribal societies, family size. 
12In the context of education policy, q can represent educational contents (curriculum), while g can 
represent educational output (measured in students' achievements). In uninstitutionalized societies, such 
as communities of ethnic minorities, a policy q∈Q can represent direction (for instance whether the 
ethnic minority renounces its claim for independence, makes diplomatic efforts to gain autonomy, uses 
peaceful protests to impose their wishes on the society, or manages guerrilla fighting against the ruler 
to gain independence) while g represents the total output in achieving any one of these goals.  
 
exert some effort e in producing the public good g. Formally, the utility function of 
each individual Ni∈ is given by:13 
   )()( iii ecgqvu −⋅=              (1) 
We assume that the non-monetary effort cost function ++ ℜ→ℜ:c  is continuously 
differentiable three times, monotonically increasing and convex (i.e., for any e>0, 
0)( >′ ec  and 0)( >′′ ec ). To avoid corner solutions and cases of multiple Nash 
equilibria, we also assume that 0)0( =c  and that 0)0( =′c . The function )(qvi  
represents individual i's private attitudes toward alternative policies. For analytical 
purposes we assume that )(qvi  is a twice continuously differentiable function, with a 
nonempty support and a single peak. We refer to )(qvi  as the policy value function of 
individual i. Whenever 0)( >qvi , individual i perceives policy q as an economic good, 
whereas for any policy q with 0)( <qvi , individual i perceives policy q as undesirable 
or an "economic bad".14 
To avoid situations where leaders choose self-damaging policies (such as 
0)( <qv j ), we assume that whenever individual j is a leader and 0)( <qv j , 
individual j's utility is −∞=)(qu j .15 We also assume that in the default case, where 
no leader is chosen to lead, the society is dismantled and each individual is left with 
zero utility. 
                                                 
13This specific formulation of the utility function implies that individuals have no utility rent from 
being leaders (no leadership ego rent). Adding the ego rent assumption (that individuals have extra 
benefit from being leaders) would not change the basic qualitative results of the model.  
14
The utility function above implies that direction and magnitude interact in a complementary fashion. 
Specifically, the more individual i favors a policy q, the more he derives benefit from the 
implementation of q (and therefore the higher are the efforts he is willing to exert in the production of 
g). This assumption is compatible with the interrelations between q and g assumed above. This 
assumption is also consistent with theoretical and empirical studies in organizational behavior and 
applied psychology that investigated individuals' work motivation in the context of social identification 
and self categorization (see Van Knippenberg (2000) and Haslam, S. et al. (2000)). 
15
 The least preferable position for any individual is to lead the society with a policy that he considers 
bad.  
 
3.2 Production 
Production of the public good g requires two inputs: leadership ability and 
communal effort. We assume that each individual Ni∈  is endowed with innate 
leadership ability K(i)∈R++, which he provides once he is chosen to be the leader. The 
total output of public good g is given by:16  
      )()( EjKg ϕ⋅=                (2) 
where E is the total effort exerted by participants in the production process and )(•ϕ  
is a monotonically increasing weakly concave function such that 
0)0( =ϕ , 0)( >•′ϕ and 0)( ≤•′′ϕ .  
 
3.3 The Society  
The foundation of a certain society is common knowledge among its members, 
fully described by the five-tuple ( )ϕθ ,)(,)(,, NiNiiNii iKqvN ∈∈∈ . 
 
3.4 The Mechanism 
The model's mechanism parallels that of Besley and Coate' model (1997) 
excluding one fundamental assumption. We add an additional stage to their political 
process, in which, after the leader is chosen and makes his political choice, society 
members voluntarily exert effort to manufacture the public good g. This assumption 
implies that every potential leader Nj∈  knows that the level of social effort he can 
recruit depends not only on his leadership ability K(j) but also on his policy choice q. 
                                                 
16
  The ability of leaders to transform effort into some public good may also depend on their policy 
choices. This means that the ability of leaders to implement a policy might depend on the policy itself, 
that is ),( qjKK = . In our model however, we ignore this possibility for the reason that such a 
relationship does not provide any significant insights beyond the tradeoffs between effort, ability, and 
policy that we already examine through the avenue of individuals' preferences.  
 
Under such conditions, a potential leader j may choose a policy q which differs from 
his original bliss point ( )(maxarg qvq jj = ) so as to elicit a higher level of effort. 
A leader is chosen in the following manner. Each individual can costlessly 
declare his desire to be a leader. Every member of society subsequently gives his 
support to one candidate at most. The candidate who receives the most powerful set of 
supporters (weighted by the power indices of each society member) is chosen to lead 
the society. In the case where more than one candidate receives maximum support, the 
leader is chosen according to a uniform lottery on the set of winning candidates. Then, 
a chosen leader declares a policy and at the final stage, society members voluntarily 
chose a level of effort to provide that leader with. To summarize, the political process 
has four stages: At stage 1, members declare their desire to lead. At stage 2, society 
members promise support to potential leaders. At stage 3, the chosen leader makes a 
policy choice q. At the final stage, society members voluntarily exert effort to 
manufacture the public good. The model is solved backwards.  
 
3.4.1 Optimal Effort Decisions given Leadership and Policy 
Suppose that some individual Nj∈  with leadership ability K(j) has been 
chosen to lead, and suppose also that the leader's policy choice is Qq∈ . Under such 
conditions, the optimal effort ie  of any individual Ni∈  is the best response to the 
level of aggregate effort iE−  exerted by other community members, and is given by: 
  )]()()()([maxarg
0
i
g
iii
e
i eceEjKqve
i
−+= −
≤   
ϕ                         (3)  
Individual i decides how much effort to exert under one of two possible conditions: If 
the leader's policy choice q is an "economic bad" in the viewpoint of individual i (i.e., 
 
0)( ≤qvi ), then individual i will exert zero effort (ei=0). Otherwise, if 0)( >qvi , a 
first-order condition implies that: 
   )()()()( ii ecEjKqv ′=′ϕ             (4) 
Lemma 1: The analytical assumptions for the cost function c(e) and the function ϕ(E) 
ensure that an effort's Nash equilibrium profile indeed exists and is unique. The Nash 
equilibrium profile of efforts ( ))(*),...,(*1 qeqe jnj  is given by: 
 
[ ]




 >′′
=
−
Otherwise
qvifEjKqvc
qe
ii
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0
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)(*
1 ϕ
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Where equation (5) is an implicit function of player i's best response with respect to 
∑
=
=
n
i
ieE
1
. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The following lemma claims that the aggregate effort is a non-decreasing function of 
the leader's ability to lead. 
Lemma 2: The analytical assumptions for the cost function c(e) and the function ϕ(E) 
ensure that the total effort E* expended in Nash equilibrium, is a non-decreasing 
function of the leader's ability K(j)  (i.e. 0)(* ≥jdKdE ). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
We denote by ∑
=
=
n
i
j
i
j qeqE
1
)(*)(*  the aggregate effort in Nash equilibrium under a 
given leader j with a policy choice q. We also denote by )(qu ji  the indirect utility of 
individual Ni∈  given that individual j is the leader and that j's chosen policy is q. 
Thus: 
   ))(*())(*()()()( qecqEjKqvqu jijiji −= ϕ             (6) 
 
 
3.4.2 The Leader's Policy Choice 
 Whenever some individual Nj∈  is chosen to be a leader, his policy choice problem is 
to maximize his indirect utility function )(qu ji (as given in equation (6)). Thus:  
  [ ]))(*())(*()()(maxarg* qecqEjKqvq jjjjQq −= ∈ ϕ            (7) 
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem. 
Proposition 1: Suppose that individuals' idiosyncratic policy value functions 
)(qvv ii =  are continuously twice-differentiable and single-peaked. Suppose also that 
some individual j was chosen to lead the society. A necessary condition for q* to be 
the leader's optimal policy choice is that: 
either    (I)       0*)( >qv j  and  qEEgqv jj ,,, ˆ −⋅=− eee
17 
  
or   (II)        0*)( =qv j . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Condition (I) in Proposition 1 implies that whenever 0)( >qv j , the chosen leader is 
facing a tradeoff between the policies he can implement and the aggregate effort he 
can elicit from society members. In terms of elasticities, condition (I) states that as 
long as the percentage increment in social output that emerges from positive changes 
in aggregate effort exceeds the percentage drop in the leader's idiosyncratic policy 
value, the leader is better off by compromising his favorite policies. Since both 
followers and potential leaders are aware of this tradeoff between policy choice and 
aggregate effort, candidates can credibly precommit themselves to compromise on 
favorite policies. 
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The letter e indicates elasticity. Namely: 
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  To demonstrate the significance of the result in proposition 1, let us compare it 
with a leader's policy choice in an institutionalized society. In institutionalized 
societies, leaders have access to authoritative institutions that presumably enable them 
to coerce each society member into exerting effort up until a level e .18 Under such 
conditions the leader's optimal decision is to implement a policy that maximizes his 
own idiosyncratic value function (i.e. ))(max(arg qvq jj = ) and to coerce each citizen 
into exerting a level of effort e . Note also that candidates cannot make any credible 
promise to implement other combinations of effort and policy even if such 
combinations are more appealing to society member, since citizens know that the 
chosen leader is better off by breaking his promise when elected.  
The implications of proposition 1 are not limited solely to a leader's policy 
choice, but reach into the realm of leadership equilibria. In section 4 we demonstrate 
how the differences in policy choice between institutionalized and uninstitutionalized 
societies impinge on leadership formation in those societies.  
We henceforth denote individual j's optimal policy as a potential leader, by 
*jq and by ( )**,...,* 1 nqqq =  the vector of sq j* .19  
 
3.4.3  Choosing a Leader (Voting)  
Suppose that the set of candidates is N⊂ℑ . Then, each society member may 
cast his support to any candidate in ℑ  or to abstain. The term "cast support to 
candidates" refers mainly to contexts lacking formal elections (uninstitutionalized 
                                                 
18For example, we can assume that an institutionalized society is equipped with sufficient monitoring 
and punitive institutions to enable leaders to monitor individuals' effort and to penalized them when 
exerting a level of effort less than e . For the sake of simplicity let assume that the level of effort e is 
sufficiently large such that eei <* for all i∈N. 
19Due to the assumptions of common knowledge and perfect information, the vector 
( )**,...,* 1 nqqq =  is correctly calculated by all society members. 
 
societies), however, for the sake of convenience, we will use the terms "support" and 
"vote" interchangeably. Let }0{∪ℑ∈iα  denote individual i's voting decision 
( ji =α denotes that individual i supports candidate ℑ∈j  and 0=iα  denotes that 
individual i abstains). We denote the voting vector by ),...,( 1 nααα = and the set of 
winning candidates by ),( αℑW , where: 
{ } { } 





ℑ∈≠∀≥ℑ∈∀=ℑ ∑∑
=∈=∈
kjklW
kNj
j
lNi
i
ii
where: ),(
:: αα
θθα   (8) 
In the default case, where the set of winning candidates is empty (such that 
φα =ℑ ),(W ), the society dismantles and each individual is left with zero utility. If 
}{),( jW =ℑ α for some ℑ∈j , then j is automatically chosen to lead. If 1),(# >ℑ αW  
then, a leader is chosen by a uniformly distributed lottery that assigns a probability of 
winning ),(#
1),(
α
α
ℑ
=ℑ
W
P l  to each candidate ),( αℑ∈Wl .  
Society members correctly anticipate the policies that would be chosen by 
potential leaders (see equation (7) and proposition 1) and vote strategically. A voting 
equilibrium is a vector, *)*,...,( 1 nαα , such that  for each individual i, 
 (I) *iα  is the best response to *i−α , namely: 
   ( )






∪ℑ∈ℑ∈ −
ℑ∈
∑ }0{:)(*)*,(,maxarg* * illiii
l
l
i quP αααα  ,        (9) 
 (II)  *iα  is not a weakly dominated voting strategy. 20 
3.4.4 Declaring Candidacy (Entry) 
Each society member must decide whether to declare his or her candidacy. 
Since an individual's benefit from entering the race depends on the entire candidate 
                                                 
20
 It is easy to verify that such a voting equilibrium indeed exists for any nonempty candidate set. In 
elections with more than two candidates, there will typically be multiple voting equilibria. 
 	
set, the decision whether to declare candidacy is strategic. Let ),...,( 1 nsss = denote 
the pure strategic entry profile, where }1,0{∈is  and si=1 denotes entry. Given the 
strategic entry profile s, the set of candidates is }1:{)( =∈∀=ℑ isNis . Each society 
member's expected utility depends on individuals' voting behavior, which is given by 
a function α(ℑ) that assigns a voting vector to each candidate configuration. Thus, 
individual i's expected payoff from a pure strategic profile s is: 21 
   ( )∑
ℑ∈
⋅ℑℑ=ℑ
)(
*)()((),()))((,(
sl
l
l
i
li qussPssU αα   (10) 
Let α(•) be a function that assigns a voting vector to each candidate configuration. An 
equilibrium of pure strategies of the entry stage (if it exists) is a profile ),...,( 1 nsss =  
such that si is the best response against s-i for each Ni∈ . Of course, equilibrium in 
pure strategies does not always exist. We therefore permit society members to mix 
entry strategies such that each society member i may choose an entry 
probability ]1,0[∈iχ . Given the function α(•), an individual's expected payoff from a 
profile of mixed strategies ),...,( 1 nχχ=Χ  is given by: 
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An equilibrium of mixed strategies is a profile ),...,( 1 nχχ=Χ  such that χi is the best 
response to χ--i for each member i. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
  Pl(ℑ(s),α( ℑ(s)) is the winning probability of candidate l∈ℑ.In the case of abstention 00 =iu . 
 

3.4.5 Equilibrium  
An equilibrium of the above leadership game is a couple **,αX , such that X* is the 
pure or mixed equilibrium of the entry game given the voting behavior )(* •α , where 
)(* ℑα  is a voting equilibrium for all non-empty candidate sets ℑ . 22 
 
4. An Expository Example 
To demonstrate how leadership in uninstitutionalized societies differs from that 
prevailing in institutionalized ones, we compare between the above leadership model 
and a similar one in which leaders have the power to coerce. To highlight the effects 
of interest, several simplifying assumptions are used. 
Consider a community },....,1{ nN =  that consists of two disjoint subsets N1 and 
N2, with 21 NNN ∪= and φ=∩ 21 NN  such that:  
Assumption 1: All individuals in each subset have identical policy preferences but 
individuals from different subsets exhibit preference heterogeneity. This specific 
characterization of homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity between groups 
enable us to aggregate individuals' decisions in each group and therefore to 
illustrate the interactions between effort and policy choice through the groups' size 
(we henceforth denote the policy value functions from subsets N1 and N2 by )(1 qv  
and )(2 qv  respectively, see figure 1 below).  
Assumption 2: For each society member Ni∈ , the value function )(qvi  is symmetric 
around its single peak, strictly concave, and all the policy value functions vi(q)s 
have an identical shape (i.e., they can be shifted into each other).23  
                                                 
22The existence of such an equilibrium follows immediately from lemma 1 and proposition 1.  
23
Specifically, there exists a strictly concave and continuously twice differentiable function v(q)such 
that:  
 
Assumption 3: Each society member has a quadratic cost function 2)( ecec ⋅=  (where 
c>0 is a constant parameter), and the production function (not factored by 
leadership input) is aEE =)(ϕ where a>0 is a constant parameter.24  
Suppose that although individuals from different subsets exhibit preference 
heterogeneity, they can still agree on a wide range of policies. Specifically, let us 
assume that,  
Assumption 4: as visualized in figure 1, the supports of the two value functions 
)(1 qv and )(2 qv contain the bliss points of all group members.25 
    [Insert figure 1 here] 
 
We now characterize equilibria under two different frameworks: one in which 
leaders cannot coerce society members into exerting effort (the uninstitutionalized 
society), and the other in which elected leaders can coerce citizens into exerting effort 
up until a level e (the institutionalized society). To ease the analysis we make an 
additional simplifying assumption:  
Assumption 5: In each subset there is only one individual with the highest leadership 
ability. We denote by j(1) and  j(2) the individuals with the highest leadership ability 
in subsets N1 and N2, respectively.26 
We start our analysis with a useful Lemma. 
Lemma 3: In both types of societies (institutionalized as well as uninstitutionalized), 
either j(1) or j(2) (or both) declare their candidacy, and one of them is chosen to lead. 
                                                                                                                                            
a) v(q) exhibits symmetry around zero (i.e., v(q)=v(-q)). 
b) v(q) has a positive single peak at zero (i.e., for all q'<q''<0 and for all 0>q''>q'  ⇒ v(q')<v(q'')<v(0)). 
c) All vi(q)s can be translated (shifted) into the function v(q) (such that )()( ii qqvqv −= ). 
24
This choice of functions is consistent with the model above and simplifies our analysis considerably. 
25
 i.e., ∈21,qq supp(vi(q))∩supp(vi(q)) (where supp(vi(q))={∀q∈Q:vi(q)≥0}). 
26
 Though this assumption is not crucial for the results, it simplifies the exposition considerably. 
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Proof: j(1) and j(2) are the most competent individuals in subsets N1 and N2, 
respectively. Since preferences are homogenous within groups, all members of N1 
prefer j(1) over any other potential candidate from N1, and likewise, members of N2 
prefer j(2) over any other potential candidate from N2.27 Note also that for both 
individuals j(1) and j(2) the “enter the race” strategy is weakly dominant and strictly 
dominant for at least one of them. Hence, either j(1) or j(2) (or both) enter the race 
and one of them is chosen to lead. 
Lemma 3 implies that in both institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies, there 
exist only three types of pure equilibria:  
(I) Equilibrium E(1,1), in which members of  N1 as well as N2 support j(1),  
(II) Equilibrium E(2,2), in which members of subset N1 and N2 support j(2), and 
(III) Equilibrium E(1,2) in which members of  N1 support j(1) and members of N2 
support j(2).28 
In what follows, we show how equilibrium in uninstitutionalized societies diverges 
from those in institutionalized ones.   
Lemma 4: In an uninstitutionalized community },....,1{ nN =  that is characterized by 
the aforementioned assumptions, the optimal policy of leader j(1) from subset N1 (a 
leader j(2) from N2)  is always bounded in the open interval )~,( 1 qq  (in the open 
interval ),~( 2qq ) (where 2/)(~ 21 qqq += ). The larger the relative size of subset N1 
(the relative size of subset N2), the closer is the choice q*1 (q*2) to the leader's bliss 
point 1q  ( 2q ) (see the thick arrows in Figure 2). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
    [Insert figure 2 here] 
                                                 
27
This holds for both institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies. 
28
 Note that the eventE(2,1) (i.e., individuals from group N1 choose j(2) whereas individuals in N2 
choose j(1)) is impossible. It is easy to verify that if individuals in subset N1 choose j(2), then j(2) is 
significantly more competent than j(1). Under such conditions, members in N2 must choose j(2) as well. 
 
Lemma 4 provides an appealing intuition to our analysis. Owning to the homogeneity 
within groups and heterogeneity between groups that characterize the society, the 
tradeoff between policy and effort materializes through the relative size of each group. 
In other words, the larger the leader's group as opposed to the other group is, the 
higher is the relative level of effort he can elicit from his own group, and therefore the 
less the leader is ready to compromise his policies. Vice versa, the larger the opposing 
group is, the higher is the relative level of effort he can elicit from the opposite group 
and therefore the more ready he is to compromise his policy. For comparison 
purposes, recall that in institutionalized societies, where leaders can enforce citizens 
into exerting efforts up until a level e , a chosen leader j cannot commit to implement 
any other policy but the one that maximizes his own policy value function vj(q).29 
The implication of the tradeoffs between efforts and policy in 
uninstitutionalized societies is not limited purely to leaders' policy choice, but reaches 
into the realm of voting decisions and leadership equilibria. In contrast to 
institutionalized societies, members in uninstitutionalized might be willing to support 
a candidate not only because he is the most competent or their most favorite, but also, 
and equally important, because he has the ability to elicit higher levels of efforts. 
Since efforts are closely linked to group size, it follows that in uninstitutionalized 
societies the relative size of each group is an imperative factor in the members' voting 
choice.  
To demonstrate how the tradeoff between policy and effort affect political 
equilibrium in uninstitutionalized societies, we identify three channels through which 
voting (supporting) decisions might impinge on leadership equilibrium: the 
"preferences gap" effect which motivates each society member to support (between 
                                                 
29
 i.e., ))(max(arg qvq j= (see the discussion following proposition 1 in section 2). 
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j(1) and j(2)) the most preferred candidate in terms of policy choice; the "leadership 
gap" effect which motivates society members to support (between j(1) and j(2)) the 
most competent candidate, and the "effort gap" effect which motivates society 
members to support a candidate who can recruit the highest level of effort. The 
"preference gap" and the "leadership gap" effects are both invariant to changes in 
group size, whereas the "effort gap" effect depends on group size considerably. Since 
the "effort gap" effect exists only in uninstitutionalized societies, it turns out that the 
relative size of each group is imperative to members' decisions in such societies.  
A formal comparative analysis of voting equilibria is now laid out. In 
institutionalized societies pure voting equilibira are totally invariant to relative group 
size. Members vote for the candidate of the opposite group only when the "leadership 
gap" affects them more than the "preference gap". Otherwise, members vote for the 
candidate of their own group. Thus, a sufficient condition for members of subset N1 to 
vote for j(2) is that ))1((
))2((
)(
)(
21
11
jK
jK
qv
qv
< ; otherwise, members of subset N1 vote for j(1)) 
(if  ))1((
))2((
)(
)(
22
12
jK
jK
qv
qv
< ).30  
We now examine how members in uninstitutionalized societies decide whether 
to support j(1) or j(2). Denote by )/#(# 11 NN=α the relative size of subset N1, and 
by ),1( 1αB  and ),2( 1αB  the welfare ratios of members in N1 and N2 under the 
leadership of j(2) and j(1), respectively.31 Equilibrium conditions imply that in 
                                                 
30
The inequalities above hold when the community N is sufficiently large (the leader's optimal level of 
effort ( )()(2 jKqv jjca ) relatively to all other society members' effort ( en )1( − ) is negligible). 
31
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= where )( 111 αu and )( 121 αu  are the utilities of 
individuals in N1 under the leadership of j(1) and j(2), respectively, and )( 112 αu and )( 122 αu  are the 
utilities of individuals in N2 under the leadership of j(1) and j(2), respectively. It is easy to verify that: 
 
uninstitutionalized societies, members of subset N1 prefer j(1) if and only if 
),1(1 1αB>  and prefer j(2) if and only if ),1(1 1αB< . These inequalities imply that the 
relative size of each group is an important factor in members' voting decisions. If, for 
example, the inequality ),1(1 1αB> holds, then members of N1 prefer j(1), either 
because the "preference gap" affects them more than both the "leadership gap" and the 
"effort gap" or because the "preference gap" and the "leadership gap" are correlated 
and together outweigh  the "effort gap" effect. The following two tables recapitulate 
the above analysis.  
   [Insert Tables 1-a and 1-b here] 
The conditions under which each type of equilibrium occurs in uninstitutionalized 
society are given in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2:  
(A) If j(1) is more competent  than j(2) then, regardless of the relative  size of 
group N1, members of  N1 will always support their candidate j(1) since their 
"leadership gap" and "preference gap" effects outweigh their "effort-gap" 
effect.  
(B) On the other hand, if j(2)'s leadership ability is higher than that of j(1) such 
that 
2
2
))1((
))2((1
ξ
η
<< jK
jK
 (the parameters η and ξ appear in figures 1 and 2) and 
if (#N1/#N) is sufficiently large, then members of N1 prefer j(1)over j(2) (the 
"leadership gap" affects members of N1's insufficiently to counterbalance the 
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"leadership gap" and "preference gap" effects). Under this condition an 
equilibrium of type E(1,2) occurs. 
(C)  Equilibria of types E(1,1) and E(2,2), in which members of one group 
support the candidate of the other, occur when the "leadership-gap" affects 
them more than the "effort gap" and the "preferences gap" (for example, 
equilibrium of type E(2,2) occurs either when 
))1((
))2((1 2
2
jK
jK
<<
ξ
η
  or when  
2
2
))1((
))2((1
ξ
η
<< jK
jK
 and (#N1/#N) is sufficiently small). 
Proof: See Appendix.  
The most important implication of Proposition 2 is that, although 
institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies might be identical in their 
characteristics, they can still differ in their political equilibria and leadership choice. 
Consider institutionalized and uninstitutionalized societies in which (#N1/#N) is very 
large, and j(1) is less competent than j(2) but still 
2
2
))1((
))2((
ξ
η
σ
η
<< jK
jK
. While 
Proposition 2 implies that the equilibrium in the uninstitutionalized society is of the 
type E(1,2),  the equilibrium in the institutionalized one is of type E(2,2) (see point A 
in figure 3). Under these conditions, j(1) becomes a leader in an uninstitutionalized 
society whereas j(2) is elected in the institutionalized one.  
    [Insert Figure 3 Here] 
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5. Charisma - a Model of Leadership with Imperfect Information 
The terms leadership and charisma, though contextually related, are not strictly 
identical. Whereas the notion of leadership can be interpreted as an individual's 
capacity to transform communal resources into some shared goal, the concept of 
charisma is related to an individual's talent to recruit these resources. From an 
economic perspective, these two notions can be associated with two separate 
environments: one with perfect information and the other with imperfect information. 
 In the case of perfect information, leadership and charisma overlap since 
leaders' abilities are fully observed and therefore in themselves motivate followers to 
deliver support and effort (see Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 in sections 3 and 4). In the 
case of imperfect information, however, followers' dedication to leaders cannot be 
based on their recognition of leaders' actual abilities (these abilities are unobservable) 
but rather, their recognition of certain observable attributes (such as self-confidence, 
poise, power, rhetorical skills, etc.). Specifically, if certain observable attributes (with 
a commonly known distribution) are positively correlated with leadership abilities, 
then, based on these attributes, society members can presumably make rational 
decisions on whether to provide potential leaders with support and effort.32 
 In this section we construct a leadership model of asymmetric information 
precisely following the description in the previous paragraph. We assume that society 
members cannot observe other persons' leadership abilities but, rather, do observe 
some personal attributes which are henceforth referred to as "external signals". These 
external signals are positively correlated with leadership ability and have a commonly 
                                                 
32
 This economic interpretation parallels Weber's definition fairly well. Weber writes: "the term 
'charisma' shall be understood to refer to an extraordinarily quality of a person, regardless of whether 
this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed.  'Charismatic authority,' hence, shall refer to a rule over 
men, whether predominantly external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit 
because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person" (Weber (1946), p. 295).  
 
known distribution.  We show that these external signals can mislead society members 
to exert more effort than they would have had they observed the leaders' actual ability.   
The main result in this section is that in uninstitutionalized societies leaders who 
are more charismatic than competent (i.e., are endowed with "external signals" that 
exceed their actual leadership abilities), can achieve more in terms of public good 
production as well as in social welfare than more competent leaders whose abilities 
are commonly known.  This counterintuitive result follows from the fact that 
voluntary provision of inputs in the production of public goods creates suboptimal 
allocation of resources. Paradoxically however, under certain conditions, 
informational asymmetries may improve this suboptimal allocation by creating 
situations whereby candidates mislead society members to overvalue them and 
therefore to exert greater effort than in situations of perfect information. In what 
follows we set the conditions under which this might happen. We start our analysis 
with a detailed description of the distribution of abilities among society members as 
well as the structure of information. 
 
5.1 Abilities, External Signals and the Structure of Information  
Assume that before the leadership game is launched, Nature makes two moves. 
The chronological order of these moves is essentially insignificant, however we 
present them in a certain order to clarify the exposition. 
First move:  Each individual Ni∈  is endowed with a "charisma parameter" ai that 
is drawn from a certain probability distribution P. The realization of the 
charisma parameter's vector ),...,( 1 naa  is immediately revealed to all society 
members and serves as an external signal.  
 	
Second move:  For each individual Ni∈ , Nature draws an independent, Bernoulli 
identically distributed lottery Ti such that:  
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where the probability  Θ is less than 1/2, and is assumed to be very small, since 
charisma is a rare quality. Henceforth, we refer to the realization of Ti as 
"individual i's deception parameter." 
  After the deception parameters Tis  are realized, each individual Ni∈  is 
endowed with a leadership ability ii TaiK −=)( . For the sake of simplicity and 
to ensure that leadership abilities are positive, we assume that dai > for all 
Ni∈ . 
After these two moves take place, each individual Ni∈ observes his own 
leadership ability K(i) but cannot observe the leadership abilities of others.  
Note that by construction, the observable charisma parameters ),...,( 1 naa  and 
the unobservable deception parameters ),...,( 1 nTT  uniquely determine the 
unobservable leadership abilities. Also note that individual i's observable charisma 
parameter ai is positively correlated with his unobservable leadership ability K(i). 33  
Before describing the leadership game, three important comments on the 
structure of information are in order:   
                                                 
33
 The specific assumption that Tis are asymmetric "Bernoulli noise" does not limit the generality of 
our results although it greatly simplifies the model's exposition. Note that as long as Ti and K(i) are 
independently distributed, their sum (ai) is positively correlated with K(i). Furthermore, the charisma 
bias, together with the possibility that asymmetric information might Pareto dominate perfect 
information, can be established by any Ti with a symmetric distribution and a zero expectation (for 
example, Ti= {-d,0,d} where P(Ti=d)=P(Ti=-d)= Θ/2 and P(Ti=0)=1-Θ) where Θ<1/2 and is assumed to 
be very small.  
 

First:  Any outside viewer who observes a given realization of a vector of external 
signals ),...,( 1 naa  must conclude that: 
I) The set of all possible states conditional on ),...,( 1 naa  is: 
{ }{ }))()((),)((:),...,( 1 daiKaiKxxx iiin −==∈==7 ω . 
II) Given the external signal ),...,( 1 naa , the probability measure on 7 is 
BnB
nxxpq
−Θ−Θ== )1(),...,()( 1ω , where B is the number of individuals 
who received a positive deception parameter d in state ω. 
Second: Recall that in any move made by Nature, each individual Ni∈ observes his 
own leadership ability K(i) but not that of the others. Under such conditions, 
given the realization of a vector of charisma parameters ),...,( 1 naa , each 
individual i has: 
I) An information function Ii that associates with every state 7∈ω  a 
non-empty subset )(ωiI of 7 such that:     
  7∈∀ω      { }iinnii xxxxxxII =7∈=∀== :),...,()),...,(()( 11 ωω .34 
II) A probability measure pi on 7 such that   
)|())(|()( iii xqIqp ωωωω == .  
Third:  The information structure described above can change throughout the 
leadership game since strategic moves in the entry stage may reveal 
information to other members. For example, if at the beginning of the game 
some individual decides to enter the race (declare candidacy), society 
members could conclude that the sole situation in which such an action would 
                                                 
34
 Note that individual i's information function )(•iI induces a partition of 7 into two disjoint 
information subsets: 
 { }))((:),...,( 1 iKaxxx iin ==7∈=∀ω  
 { }))((:),...,( 1 diKaxxx iin +==7∈=∀ω  . 
 
be rational is one where that the candidate's charisma parameter equals his 
leadership ability.  
 
5.2 The Leadership Game with Imperfect Information 
In order to provide a tractable framework for our analysis, we assume that all 
society members have the same policy preferences (i.e., )(...)()( 1 qvqvqv n=== ).35 
This assumption implies that any winning candidate will choose the policy 
q*=argmax{v(q)}. For the sake of convenience, assume that  max v(q)=1.  
Following the realization of Nature's random moves and the allocation of 
information among society members, the leadership game is now conducted in three 
sequential stages: At stage 1, members declare their desire to lead (become 
candidates), at stage 2 society members grant support to potential leaders and at stage 
3 (after the leader is elected), society members voluntarily exert effort to produce a 
public good.  
The model is solved backwards.  
 
5.2.1 Optimum Effort Decisions given Leadership 
Suppose that some individual Nj∈  with an external signal (charisma 
parameter) aj and leadership ability K(j) (such that jj TajK −=)( ) is chosen to lead a 
society. We must consider two possibilities about the information individuals hold. 
One is that information about j's leadership ability was not revealed throughout the 
previous stages, and therefore other members do not know j's leadership ability K(j). 
                                                 
35
Maintaining the assumption that individuals differ in their political preferences creates a strategic 
dependence between the leader's political choice and the information followers have in the next stage. 
This strategic dependence may complicate the model while adding very little to our understanding of 
the charisma bias and its implications.    
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The other possibility is that strategic moves in previous stages revealed j's leadership 
ability K(j).36   
The case where individuals in }{\ jN  know j's leadership ability was already 
solved in Lemma 1 (see section 3). It remains to analyze the case where individuals in 
}{\ jN  do not know j's leadership ability, but observe j's external signal aj. Under this 
condition, j's leadership ability )( jK  is perceived by individuals in }{\ jN  as a 
random variable, whereby jajK =)(  with probability 1-Θ and dajK j −=)(  with 
probability Θ. Each individual's objective is to maximize his expected utility function 
( )jjii au | , conditional on the leader's observable parameter aj.  
Let ei and },{ jiE− denote the effort that individual Ni∈ exerts, and the total effort 
of society members (excluding individual i and the leader j), respectively. If some 
individual i in }{\ jN is unaware of j's leadership ability, he calculates his best 
response by maximizing his expected utility jiu  given },{ jiE−  and given that the 
leader's effort is conditional on his own leadership ability, [ ])( jKe j . Individual i 
therefore solves the following optimization problem: 
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Substituting the model parameters and calculating the expected utility provides: 
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where ])([ jj ajKe = is the leader's effort if his leadership ability is jajK =)( , and  
])([ dajKe jj −=  if his leadership ability is dajK j −=)( . 
                                                 
36
 It is commonly known that all individuals in }{\ jN  have the same information about j, at the 
onset and throughout the game. Furthermore, as individual j knows his own actions and their 
implications for other members' information, he must know what other members know about him (and 
of course what all other members know that he knows). 
 
The first order condition of this problem is given by: 
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In Nash equilibrium, each individual i's optimal effort (where }{\ jNi∈ ) is:  
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Leader j calculates his optimal effort knowing that the remaining society members are 
unaware of his leadership ability (although he himself does know it). Hence, leader j 
solves the optimization problem:  
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ϕ     (3'') 
Lemma 5: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium profile of efforts such that all non-
leader individuals exert the same level of effort. The level of effort as well as the ex-
ante utility function of all individuals (including that of the leader) increases with aj.  
Proof: See the Appendix  
 
5.2.2 Choosing a Leader (Voting) 
Suppose that the set of candidates is N⊂ℑ . Each individual may cast his 
support to any candidate inℑ . Note that due to our assumption that all individuals 
have the same policy preferences, the abstention alternative is strategically dominated 
by all other voting alternatives and therefore is no longer relevant. We denote by αi 
the voting decision of individual i, and the voting vector by ),...,( 1 nααα = . The entire 
set of candidates who receive the majority of votes weighted by their index power is 
denoted by ),( αℑW , where: 
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If }{),( jW =ℑ α for some ℑ∈j , then j is automatically chosen to lead. If 
1),(# >ℑ αW , then a leader is chosen by a uniformly distributed lottery that assigns 
probability ),(#
1),(
α
α
ℑ
=ℑ
W
P l  to each candidate in ),( αℑW . 
Denote by )(ℑiI  individual i's information set given that the set of running 
candidates is ℑ . Since the result of an individual's actions depends on the actions 
taken by the rest of society, the decision whether to support a candidate or not is 
strategic. A supporting equilibrium is thus a vector *)*,...,( 1 nαα  such that for each 
individual i, *iα  is the optimal reaction to *i−α , specifically: 
 ( ) ( )





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ℑ∈ℑℑ∈ −
ℑ∈
∑ iiliiii
l
l
i IuP αααα :)(|*)*,(,maxarg*   ,                     (9') 
Proposition 3: The profile of voting strategies *)*,...,(* 1 nααα =  where 
{ } ℑ∈ℑ= jijiii Iu )(|(maxarg* α  for all Ni∈  is a profile of a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: Note that ex ante, society members have no benefits-producing deviant 
strategy. 
 
5.2.3 Declaring Candidacy (Entry) 
Each society member can decide whether to declare his candidacy. We assume 
that in the default case, when no community member presents himself as a candidate, 
the society is dismantled and all community members are left with zero utility.  
 Due to informational asymmetries, the stage in which individuals decide 
whether or not to declare candidacy is a Bayesian game. We denote 
by ),...,( 1 nsss = the profile of pure entry strategies (where }1,0{∈is ) and by 
 
}1:{)( =∈∀=ℑ isNis  the set of candidates given ),...,( 1 nsss = . Individual i's 
utility depends on the entry strategies and the state ω:  
  ( ) ( )ωαωα |)(),()),(,(
)(
l
i
sl
li ussPsU ⋅ℑ=⋅ ∑
ℑ∈
. 
In such a Bayesian game, a Nash equilibrium of pure strategies (if it exists) is a 
function that assigns to each state 7∈ω  the profile ))(*),...,(*()(* 1 ωωω nsss =  
such that: 
i) For any individual Ni∈ , individual i's strategy depends on his 
information set (i.e., )(*)(* ωω ′′=′ ii ss  for any )(, ωωω iI∈′′′ ).  
ii) For any individual Ni∈ , the strategy )(* ωis  is the best response to 
)(* ωis − . 
Of course, equilibrium in pure strategies does not always exist. We therefore permit 
society members to mix entry decision strategies such that each member i may choose 
an entry probability ]1,0[∈iχ . Given the charisma vector ),...,( 1 naa  and given the 
function α(•) that assigns voting vectors to all candidates' configurations, the 
expected payoff of individual i from a profile of mixed strategies ),...,( 1 nχχ=Χ  in 
each state 7∈ω  (conditional on ),...,( 1 naa ) is given by: 
[ ]∑ ∏
∈ =
−




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⋅−=⋅
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n
k
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k
s
k
i sUXU
2 1
)1( )),(,()1()),(,( ωαχχωα                    (11') 
Nash theorems ensure that a (mixed or pure) equilibrium in the entry stage indeed 
exists. 
To concentrate on what we will call the charisma bias and its applications, we 
characterize only one equilibrium of pure strategies at the entry stage. 
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Proposition 4:  Let ),...,( 1 naa be a realization of the charisma parameters and let 
7∈ω  be a realization of a state (conditional on ),...,( 1 naa ). If for some individual 
Nj∈  the condition ( )lljjjj auu |>  holds for every }{\ jNl ∈ , then individual j's 
optimal strategy is to enter the race. If, in addition, the inequality ( ) hmjjmm uau >|  
holds for any }{\ jNh∈ and Nm∈ , when either hahK =)(  or dahK h −=)( , then 
individual j is chosen to lead. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
5.3 Charisma Bias 
We now demonstrate the charisma bias phenomenon. We also show that under 
certain conditions, the charisma bias can be socially desirable. The detailed 
assumptions of this scenario whereby less competent but more charismatic leaders can 
achieve more in terms of social goals and welfare than competent but non-charismatic 
leaders follow. 
 Consider a society },...,1{ nN = . For the sake of simplicity, assume that each 
society member Ni∈  has a quadratic effort cost function 2)( ceec = , and that the 
production function is linear and given by aEE =)(ϕ . Let us also assume that before 
the society conducts a leadership game, Nature draws a vector of charisma parameters 
),...,( 1 naa  and a state 7∈ω  (conditional on ),...,( 1 naa ) such that 21 l
ad <<  for 
every Nl ∈ . These assumptions yield very tractable solutions to the optimal effort 
problem of leaders as well as followers (see Lemma 6 in the appendix). 
The following proposition demonstrates the charisma bias. 
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Proposition 5: If in a society N the realization of the charisma vector 
),...,( 1 naa and the state 7∈ω  (conditional on ),...,( 1 naa ) are such that two 
individuals Njl ∈, satisfy the following conditions: 
i) All individuals know that individuals l,j have the greatest leadership 
capacity (i.e., for any },{\ ljNi∈ , daaa ijl +>, ). 
ii) Individual l is more competent than j but individual j has a higher 
charisma parameter such that lj aa > , )()( lKjK <  and 
jl adjKdjKlKajK       )(      )(      )(    )( =+<Θ+<=< ,  
then there exists a unique equilibrium for the leadership game in which individual j 
(the more charismatic but less competent leader) is chosen to lead.  
Proof: See the Appendix. 
We now set the conditions under which replacing a competent leader with a less 
competent but more charismatic leader may improve social welfare.   
Consider the same society },...,1{ nN =  as described above, which has at least 
four members. For comparative purposes, assume that the leadership game is played 
twice and that the realization of the charisma vector ),...,( 1 naa and the state 7∈ω  
(conditional on ),...,( 1 naa ) are identical in both games for all individuals excluding 
individual j. Assume also that in the first game, individual j is endowed with 
leadership ability jajK ˆ)(ˆ = , whereas in the second game, individual j is less 
competent but more charismatic. Specifically, j's leadership capacity and charisma 
parameter are replaced in the second game such that the j's leadership capacity )( jK  
is less than )(ˆ jK  (his capacity in the first game) although his new charisma parameter 
ja  is higher now than in the first game (i.e., jj ajKdjKa ˆ)(ˆ)( =>+= ). The next 
 
proposition sets down the conditions under which the equilibrium in the second game 
Pareto dominates the equilibrium in the first game. For the sake of robustness, we 
assume that j's leadership capacity in the first game )(ˆ jK is observable by all 
members.37   
Proposition 6: If a society },...,1{ nN =  has at least four members, and if the 
realization of the charisma vector ),...,( 1 naa as well as the state 7∈ω  (conditional 
on ),...,( 1 naa ) are such that some individual j has a leadership capacity jajK ˆ)(ˆ =  
whereby dajK i +>)(ˆ  for all }{\ jNi∈ , then, even if  )(ˆ jK is observable by all 
society members, there exists some 1*0 << z  such that diminishing j's leadership 
ability by z*d (i.e., dzjKjK *)(ˆ)( −= ) and endowing individual j with a deception 
parameter dT j =  (such that his new charisma parameter is 
jj adzjKdjKa ˆ*)1()(ˆ)( >−+=+= ) will lead to a higher production of the public 
good as well as welfare improvement for all society members. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
6. Concluding Remarks  
This paper has analyzed the process of leadership formation in uninstitutionalized 
societies whereby leaders do not have enforceable means to collect resources (effort) 
from society members. The fundamental characteristic of such uninstitutionalized 
societies is that leadership capacities (the ability of leaders to transform individual 
resources into social goals) as well as leaders' policy preferences are salient primarily 
                                                 
37
 This assumption only reinforces the result. Note that if in the first game (where )(ˆˆ jKa j = ), 
society members know that j's leadership ability is )(ˆ jK , then they exert more effort and gain higher 
utility than when they do not know whether dajK j −= ˆ)(ˆ  or jajK ˆ)(ˆ = .  
 	
due to their effect on followers' incentives to exert efforts. This characteristic has two 
important implications for leadership formation.  
The first implication is that due to tradeoffs between policy, effort and leadership 
capacity that emerge in uninstitutionalized societies but are absent in institutionalized 
ones, policy choice and leadership formation may operate differently in each. 
Specifically, members in uninstitutionalized societies might be willing to compromise 
their preferred policies in order to obtain leaders who can recruit a higher level of 
effort, and leaders in such societies can credibly commit to compromise policies they 
favor in order to obtain a higher level of collective effort.  
The second implication is that false signals about leadership abilities (as well as 
how society members perceive these signals) may lead to leadership choice that is 
biased toward more charismatic but less competent leaders. We showed that in 
uninstitutionalized societies, this charisma bias can be socially desirable.   
 
APPENDIX  
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume that some individual j is the leader and that his policy 
choice is q. Let M⊂N be the set of society members who view policy q as a positive 
policy (i.e., { }0)(: >∈= qvNiM i ). A sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium to 
exist is that equation (5) holds for each society member Ni∈ . All society members 
not in subset M must choose the nil strategy ei=0. A summation of equation (5) over 
the subset M of society members concludes in: 
                     [ ]∑
∈
− ′′=
Mi
i EjKqvcE )()()(1 ϕ                                                    (***) 
The analytical assumptions on c(e) and ϕ(E) ensure that the summation 
[ ]∑
∈
− ′′
Mi
i EjKqvc )()()(1 ϕ  is a continuously positive, monotonically non-increasing 
 

function of E. Under such conditions, the intermediate value theorem implies that 
equation (***) holds for a unique E* > 0. 
Substituting E* into equation (5) for each society member Ni∈  yields a Nash 
equilibrium profile of efforts ( ))(*),...,(*),...,(*1 qeqeqe jnjjj , as required. 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Define a function ( ) [ ]∑
∈
− ′′−=
Mi
i EjKqvcEjKEG )()()()(, 1 ϕ . The first order condition 
(see equation (***) in the proof of Lemma 1) implies that, ( ) 0)(),(* =jKqEG . 
Applying the implicit function theorem on G yields: 
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Our analytical assumptions on ϕ(e) and c(e) ensure that the last term of (*) is non-
negative, and therefore, 0)(
)(* ≥jdK
qdE
. .  
Proof of Proposition 1:  
Applying the first order condition and the envelope condition on the leader's indirect 
utility function in a Nash equilibrium (equation (7)) provides: 
0
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This is equivalent to: 
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But [ ] 0*))(*()()()( =′−′
dq
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qecEqvjK
j
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jj ϕ  because either 0)( ≥qv j , and then the 
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leader's optimal effort condition given in equation (4) implies that: 
[ ] 0))(*()()()( =′−′ qecEqvjK jjj ϕ , or 0)( <qv j  and then 0* =dq
de jj
.  
Hence, since 0*))(*()())(*()()(
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  Manipulation of the last equation leads to ∑
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, which 
implies that qEEzqv jgj ,,, −⋅=− eee .  
Since the leader's utility equals -∞ at 0)( <qv j , the above condition can hold only 
when 0)( ≥qv j . Otherwise, q* is such that 0*)( =qv j  . 
Proof of Lemma 4: The lemma claims that each potential leader j(1) in subset N1 (or 
each potential leader j(2) in subset N2) will choose a policy *)1(jq  such that 
qqq j ~*)1(1 <<   (or will choose a policy *)2(jq  in  2)2( *~ qqq j << ). Furthermore, the 
optimal policy of j(1) *)1(jq  approaches 1q  when n
n1 increases (i.e. 0)/(
*
1
)1( <
∂
∂
nn
q j
 
and 11/)1( 1
* qq
nn
j
→
→ ). The optimal policy of j(2)  *)2(jq  approaches 2q when n
n2
 
increases (i.e., 0)/(
*
2
)2( >
∂
∂
nn
q j
 and 21/)2( 2
* qq
nn
j
→
→ ). 
In order to prove this claim we first show that under the assumptions (1)-(5) (in sec 4), 
there exists only one solution to the leaders' policy choice problem. We then 
characterize this solution. Note that our specification ensures that the utility function 
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of any potential leader j ( ) 





−= ∑
∈
)()()()()( 2122
2 qvqvjKqvqu j
Mu
ujc
aj
j  (either j(1) from 
N1 or j(2) from N2)   has no more than one maximum point in the interval between 
the two peaks ),( 21 qq .  
This is due to the fact that in this domain ( ),( 21 qq ), the utility function is a product of 
a positive concave function 





−∑
∈
)()( 21 qvqv j
Mu
u  and a positive monotonic decreasing 
or increasing concave function )(qv j . (It is easy to verify that a product of two 
functions u(x)=f(x)g(x), when f(x) is a general concave positive function and g(x) is a 
monotonic (increasing or decreasing) positive concave function in an open interval I, 
has a unique maximum point in I.)   
Denote nn /11 =α  and nn /22 =α  and define two functions, ),( 11 αqG , ),( 22 αqG , 
such that: 
[ ] [ ]{ })()1()()/1()()()1()()(),( 211112111111 qvqvnqvqvqvqvnqG ′−+′−+−+′= ααααα  and 
[ ] [ ]{ })()1()()/1()()()()1()(),( 122222212222 qvqvnqvqvqvqvnqG ′−+′−++−′= ααααα . 
First- and second-order conditions imply that any potential leader j(1) from subset N1 
will choose a policy *)1(jq  such that 0)*,( 1)1(1 =αjqG  and 0)*,( 1)1(1 <∂
∂
αjqGq
, and 
that any potential leader j(2) from subset N2 will choose a policy *)2(jq   such that 
0)*,( 2)2(2 =αjqG  and 0)*,( 2)2(2 <∂
∂
αjqGq
. 
For any potential leader j(1) from subset N1,  
0),( 111 >αqG        (specifically 0)()()1(),( 12111111 >′−= qvqnvqG αα ), 
 0),~( 11 <αqG         (specifically 0)~()~()12(),~( 11111 <′−= qvqvnqG α ) 
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Hence, from the intermediate value theorem there exists at least one point q* in the 
interval )~,( 1 qq such that 0)*,( 11 =αqG and 0)*,( 11 <∂
∂
αqG
q
. However, as )(qu jj has 
only one extreme point between the two peaks in interval ),( 21 qq , this point q* must 
be unique. 
Hence, for any potential leader j(1) in the subset N1, the optimal policy *)(ijq  must lie 
in the interval )~,( 1 qq . The same arguments apply for ),( 22 αqG , which yields that for 
any potential leader j(2) in the subset N2, the optimal policy *)2(jq  must lie in the 
interval ),~( 2qq . Applying the implicit function theorem in the relevant domains leads 
to:   
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Define: 
)()()/12(),(lim)( 111111 1 qvqvnnqGq ′−== → αδ α   
)()()/12(),(lim)( 222212 2 qvqvnnqGq ′−== → αδ α . 
As 0)( 11 =qδ    and     0)( 22 =qδ  it follows that 
11/)1( 1
* qq
nn
j
→
→     and      21/)2( 2
* qq
nn
j
→
→  . 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
From Lemma 4, j(2)'s optimal policy as a leader always lies in the interval 
],~( 2qq while  j(1)'s optimal policy as a leader always lies in )~,[ 1 qq . Hence, the event 
that members of N1 (including j(1)) vote for j(2) can occur only if j(2) has a higher 
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leadership ability than does j(1). This implies that whenever K(j(1))>K(j(2)), members 
of N1 will not support j(2). 
Now suppose that K(j(1))<K(j(2)) such that 
2
2
))1((
))2((1
ξ
η
<< jK
jK
. 
Given equilibrium, it follows that individual j(1) will declare his candidacy. However, 
members of N1 support j(1) only when the welfare gap between the position when j(1) 
is leading and when j(2) is leading is more than one. This implies that individuals 
from N1 vote for j(1) only if 
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Which implies that 
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Denote the left-hand side of the last inequality by 
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As ),1( 1αW is a continuous function of α1, and because 2
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a sufficiently small 0>ε  and a sufficiently large 1ˆ0 <<α  such that 
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 for all α1 where, 1ˆ 1 <<αα . 
This proves the argument that whenever K(j(1))<K(j(2)) and 
2
2
))1((
))2((1
ξ
η
<< jK
jK
, there 
exists a threshold ratio 1ˆ0 <<α  such that for any αˆ1 >
n
n
,  individual j(1) declares 
his candidacy and all members of N1 vote for him. 
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If, on the other hand, 
))1((
))2((1 2
2
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jK
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ξ
η
, then 
2
1 ))1((
))2((),1( 
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



< jK
jKW α  and all members of 
N1 (including j(1)) support j(2).  
Proof of Proposition 3: To prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we 
use the same considerations associated with Lemma 1 in Section 2. The equilibrium 
here is calculated in two stages. In the first stage, we obtain from equation (5') that: 
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In the second stage, )(* jj aE−  is plugged into equation (3'') by the leader. Note that 
the non-leader individuals are identical in their target functions and therefore have the 
same best response. The implicit function theorem (applied on equation (***')) 
implies that )(* jj aE− increases with aj. Appling Lemma 2 to equation (***') 
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The condition that ( )lljjjj auu |>  implies that according to 
the information available in the entry stage, individual j's utility as a leader is greater 
than his ex-ante expected utility as a follower. Hence, individual j's strategy "enter the 
race", is strictly dominant. If, in addition, the inequality ( ) hmjjmm uau >|  holds for 
any }{\ jNh∈  and any Nm∈  when either hahK =)(  or dahK h −=)( , then all 
individuals recognize that their ex-ante expected utility is higher under j's leadership 
than under any other potential leader. Under such conditions, the best strategy of all 
community members is to support individual j. 
Lemma 6: Assume that 2)( ecec ⋅=  and aEE =)(ϕ . If some individual Nj∈ with 
leadership capacity K(j) and charisma parameter aj is chosen to lead, then: 
i) the optimal effort of each individual }{\ jNi∈  is )(2* dae jcai Θ−= ,  
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ii) the leader's optimal effort is )(2* jKe caj = ,  
iii) the total effort in Nash equilibrium is: [ ])())(1(* 2 jKdanE jca +Θ−−=  ,  
iv) the ex-ante utility of each individual }{\ jNi∈  in Nash equilibrium is: 
( ) { }22212 )1())((| 2 ddanau jcajji Θ−Θ+Θ−−= ,  
v) the utility function of the leader j depends on his deception parameter Tj , given 
by: 
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Proof: Substituting the cost function 2)( ecec ⋅=  and the production function 
aEE =)(ϕ in the first-order condition (equations (4') and (3'')) yields these results.  
Proof of Proposition 5: We show that conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that Proposition 4 
holds. First, due to condition (i), the inequality ( )iijjjj auu |>  holds for 
all },{\ ljNi∈ . We now show that due to condition (ii), this inequality holds for 
individual l as well. 
Condition (ii), stating that djKlKjK Θ+<< )()()( , implies that there exists some z 
where 10 <Θ<< z  such that zdjKlK += )()(  for individual l. Hence, 
( )lljjjj auu |>  if and only if 
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But as d<K(j) and n>2 , the last inequality must hold. 
Individuals in }{\ jN  (including individual l) do not know j's leadership ability. 
Specifically, they do not know whether jajK =)( or dajK j −=)( . However, they 
 
do know that in any case (either when jajK =)(  or when dajK j −=)( ), the 
inequality ( )iijjjj auu |>  holds. They therefore know that individual j necessarily 
enters the race.  
We now show that due to Proposition 4, all society members must vote for  j. 
Since the inequality daaa ijl +>,  holds for any },{\ ljNi∈ , it must be that 
i
i
j
i uu >  for any },{\ ljNi∈ . Furthermore, since  djKlKajK l Θ+<=< )(     )(    )(  
for l and j and since 0 < Θ<1/2, the inequality ( ) lljjll uau >|  must hold as well. 
Hence, the conditions of Proposition 4 hold.  Therefore, in equilibrium, individual j is 
chosen to lead even though individual l is more competent. 
Proof of Proposition 6: First, note that in both cases (before and after changing 
individual j's endowments), individual j is chosen to lead. This is due to the fact that 
the inequality daaa ijj +>,ˆ  holds for any }{\ jNi∈ , which implies that individual 
j's superior leadership abilities are commonly known by all members in both games 
(before and after changing j's endowments).   
Denote the utility of all society members, in equilibrium, in the first leadership game 
by )ˆ,...,ˆ( 1 nuu , and the utility of all society members, in equilibrium, in the second 
leadership game by ),...,( 1 nuu . The necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
proposition to hold are: 
I)  jjjj uu <ˆ  
II)  jiji uu <ˆ  for all }{\ jNi∈ . 
Note that in the first case, where all society members observe j's leadership 
capacity )(ˆ jK , the effort exerted by each society member (leader and non-leaders) is 
given by )(ˆ* 2 jKe caj = . Under such conditions, total effort is given 
 
by )(ˆ* 2 jKnE caj = and each society member (the leader and the non-leaders) has an 
ex-post utility 2212 ))(ˆ)((ˆˆ
2 jKnuu
c
aj
i
j
j −== . 
However, in the case where djKa j += )( , the effort exerted by all non-leaders is  
))1()((* 2 Θ−+= djKe cai  while the effort exerted by the leader is  )(* 2 jKe caj = . 
Hence, total effort is given by [ ]))1()(1()(* 2 Θ−−+= dnjnKE ca , and the ex-post 
utility of each non-leader i is given by:   
 [ ],)1(()())1()(2())()((
*)(
22
2
12
2
1
2
2
2
Θ−−Θ−−+−=
−=
djKdnjKn
ceaEjKu
c
a
i
j
i
  
while the leader's utility is given by: 
   
[ ])())1()(1())()((
*)(
2
2
1
2
2
2 jKdnjKn
ceaEjKu
c
a
j
j
j
Θ−−+−=
−=
. 
These calculations imply that condition (I) ( jjjj uu <ˆ  ) holds if and only if  
 
[ ]2221 ))(())(ˆ()()())1()(1( jKjKnjKdn −−>Θ−− .  
If dzjKjK −= )(ˆ)( , then the last inequality holds if and only if 
 (***)       [ ]






Θ−+−
−
−
>Θ− ))1(())(ˆ2
1
)()(ˆ)1( 2
1
ddzjK
n
n
zjK  
 For n>3, a sufficient condition for inequality (***) to hold is that  
 [ ]





 Θ−+−>Θ− ))1(())(ˆ2
5
4)(ˆ)1( ddzjKzjK . 
Since the right-hand side of the last inequality is a non-negative continuous function 
of z that converges to zero when z converges to zero ( 0)(
0
=
→z
zRHS ), a sufficiently 
small z(I) exists where 1)I(0 << z  such that for all z, )I(0 zz << . If the last 
inequality holds, it implies that the first necessary condition stated above likewise 
holds.  
 	
Condition (II), that jiji uu <ˆ , holds for all }{\ jNi∈  if and only if  
[ ] 2212221221 ))(ˆ)(())1(()())1()(2())()(( jKndjKdnjKn −>Θ−−Θ−−+−  
If dzjKjK −= )(ˆ)( , the last inequality implies that: 
( )[ ] 0)1())(ˆ()())1()(2( 222121 >Θ−−−−−Θ−− ddzjKdzndn  
For n>3, the left-hand side, which is a continuous function of z, converges to some 
positive number when z converges to zero. This implies that there exists a sufficiently 
small z(II)  ( 1)II(0 << z ) such that the above inequality holds for all )II(0 zz << .  
We therefore conclude that conditions (I) and (II), above, hold for any z such 
that )}II(),I(min{*0 zzzz =<< .  
The previous analysis implies that diminishing the leadership ability )(ˆ jK of the 
leader by z*d and endowing him with a deception parameter (i.e., charisma) will 
strictly Pareto improve the allocation of resources.  It remains to show that individual 
j produces a higher quantity of the public good g in the second game than in the first 
one. Note that each individual }{\ jNl ∈ exerts more costly effort in the second game 
than in the first, and ex-post obtains higher utility (although the leader is less 
competent). This allocation can be achieved only when the quantity of the public good 
in the second game exceeds the quantity of the public good in first game sufficiently 
to outweigh the loss in leadership ability and the increased cost of effort.   
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The upper and lower diagrams represent different equilibria in institutionalized and uninstitutionalized 
societies, respectively. The horizontal axis represents the leadership gap effect (symbolized by 
K(j(2))/K(j(1))) whereas the vertical axis represents N1's relative size (symbolized by α). Point A in 
both diagrams represents different equilibria in uninstitutionalized and institutionalized societies under 
similar conditions. 
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Table (1-a): Possible Equilibria in Uninstitutionalized Societies  
  E(1,1) 
j(1) is chosen 
),1( 1 1αB>  
,
 ),2(1 1αB>   
 
For members in N1: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect+ effort gap effect 
or the preference gap effect+ leadership gap>effort gap effect 
For members in N2: 
The preference gap effect<leadership gap+ effort gap effect 
E(2,2) 
j(2) is chosen 
),1( 1 1αB< , 
 ),2(1 1αB<  
For members in N1: 
the preference gap effect<leadership gap+ effort gap effect 
For members in N2: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect+ effort gap effect 
or the preference gap effect+ leadership gap>effort gap effect 
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 If ∑∑
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<
21 Nu
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u θθ
then j(2) is chosen (In case of a tie, each is chosen 
with probability 1/2). 
),1( 1 1αB> , 
 ),2(1 1αB<  
For members in N1: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect+ effort gap effect 
or the preference gap effect+ leadership gap>effort gap effect 
 
For members in N2: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect+ effort gap effect 
or the preference gap effect+ leadership gap>effort gap effect 
 
Table (1-b): Possible Voting Equilibria in Institutionalized Societies  
  
 E(1,1) 
j(1) is elected  
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For members in N1: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect 
 
For members in N2: 
The preference gap effect<leadership gap 
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j(2) is elected 
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For members in N1: 
The preference gap effect<leadership gap effect 
 
For members in N2: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect 
E(1,2) 
 If  #N1>#N2 Then j(1) is chosen. 
Otherwise j(2) is chosen. 
(In case of a tie, each is chosen with probability 1/2) 
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For members in N1: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect 
 
For members in N2: 
 The preference gap effect>leadership gap effect 
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